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Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A
Florida Case Law Survey and Analysis
KENDALL B. COFFEY*
Recent decisions of the Florida district courts of appeal
have engrafted inconsistent requirements on the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act's requisites for contribution.
The author critically examines these decisions and explores the
mechanics of seeking contribution under the Act. The article
also explores the effect of release from liability on joint
tortfeasors and defendants who settle with plaintiffs, an ex-
tremely troublesome area that is frought with traps for the
unwary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contribution is a right of action entitling one party liable in
tort to impose a share of damages awarded the plaintiff upon an-
other party jointly or concurrently liable for the same tort. This
loss allocation device was born in equity and codified by the State
of Florida in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasers Act
("Uniform Contribution Act.").1 When Florida passed the Uniform
Contribution Act, it joined the great majority of states recognizing
* Associate with the firm of Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel &
Wolff, P.A., Miami, Florida; former law clerk to the Honorable Lewis R. Morgan, Circuit
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-108 (codified, as amended, at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1981)). For a
description of the background of contribution, see Love v. Gibson, 2 Fla. 598, 620 (1849).
See also VTN Consol., Inc. v. Coastal Eng'r Assocs., 341 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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the right of contribution in negligence actions.2 Borrowed from
proposed model contribution legislation, the Florida statute cre-
ates rights markedly different from the seemingly related case law
doctrines of indemnity and subrogation.
Indemnity is a case law doctrine related to statutory contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors.4 Indemnity, however, is distinguisha-
ble from contribution in two fundamental respects. First, it is not
founded on joint participation in a tort, but instead arises from an
express or implied promise by one party to compensate another
party for damages caused by claims of a third party.' Insurance
contracts are classic examples of express indemnity agreements.'
2. More than forty states now allow contribution; a majority create this right by stat-
ute. See Comment, Contribution in Missouri - Procedure and Defenses Under the New
Rule, 44 Mo. L. REv. 691, 694 (1979). Before promulgating the Uniform Contribution Act,
Florida generally recognized no such right in tort, although that rule was subject to various
exceptions. See generally Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
This article will focus on Florida's statutory right of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. The term "contribution," however, also describes the rights among co-obligors of
a joint obligation in contract. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956). See generally
Walker v. Sarven, 41 Fla. 210, 25 So. 885 (1899). This contractual basis of joint liability
arises when parties are co-makers of the same note or otherwise become jointly obligated for
a common debt.
There are two significant common law rules concerning joint obligation in contract.
First, each joint obligor is an indispensable party and must be joined in any suit by the
creditor. Alderman v. Puleston, 24 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1946); Edward Corp. v. David M. Woolin
& Son, 113 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). Second, the release of one joint obligor
releases all, even if the obligee intends to release only one joint obligor. Atlantic Coastline
R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956); Eason v. Lau, 369 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978); see also Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1980). A recently en-
acted Florida statute eliminates this common law rule. FLA. STAT. § 46.015 (1981).
Today these traditional rules create few impediments to suits by creditors because mod-
ern commercial paper invariably provides that the liability of co-obligors shall be severable
as well as joint. The contribution doctrine, however, still remains a significant basis for pro
rata recoupment among debtors who have discharged a common obligation. Walker v. Sar-
ven, 41 Fla. 210, 25 So. 885 (1899); Epstein v. Drusin, 249 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 3d DCA
1971). See also Mackler v. Weiss, 80 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1955) (co-obligor who pays more than
his share of debt is entitled to contribution).
3. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Contribution Among Tortfeasors 59 (1979). The Uniform
Contribution Act is one of almost two dozen model statutes proposed by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws. See 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 167, 172 n.25 (1979).
4. See generally Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979); Charles
Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Equip. Co., 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979); Stuart
v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
5. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d at 493.
6. E.g., Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 374 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979); American Home Assurance Co. v. City of Opa Locks, 368 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979). The rule as to indemnities given by parties who are not regular insurers is that
"the indemnity provision must be construed in favor of the indemnitor." Sol Walker & Co.
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 362 So. 2d 45, 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also Spring
Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co. v. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc., 358 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d
[Vol. 35:971
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An implied right of indemnity arises when a special relationship or
duty exists that entitles a wrongdoer to shift his total loss to an-
other party.7 Recent Florida cases have limited the equitable reach
of implied indemnity by rejecting the "active-passive" test, which
allowed a "passive" tortfeasor (one secondarily liable) to shift his
total loss to an "active" tortfeasor s The cases now emphasize that
one seeking indemnity must be without any fault and only "vicari-
ously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable for the
wrongful acts"9 of the indemnitor. That technical liability must
originate from a special duty, not from a weighing of the relative
fault of the tortfeasors.' 0
The second distinction between contribution and indemnity
lies in their respective consequences. Contribution provides only a
proportional sharing of the judgment awarded a claimant; indem-
nity provides the indemnitee with full reimbursement for all dam-
ages, including his costs and attorneys' fees.11
The right of subrogation, like indemnity, is created either by
contract or by operation of law based on equitable considerations.
It generally arises in contractual settings and allows one who has
properly satisfied a debt owed by another to step into the shoes of
the satisfied creditor and assert the latter's original claim against
the debtor.12 In contrast to its recent narrowing of the scope of
indemnity, the Supreme Court of Florida has apparently expanded
the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the tort context. In Un-
derwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,'5 the court al-
lowed the first wrongdoer who had paid the injured party's claim
DCA 1978), aff'd in part, quashed in part on other grounds, 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979).
7. See Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA
1966).
8. For a thoughtful review of the development and demise of the "active-passive" test,
see 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 345, 348-49 (1980).
9. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d at 492.
10. Id. at 493.
11. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1981) (permitting tortfeasors to share pro rata in
the entire liability) and Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977) (construing FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1975)) with Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.
v. Philco Fin., 356 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (attorneys fees made part of damage
award may be entirely assumed by one party in indemnity cases).
12. Subrogation has co-existed with contribution and indemnity in Florida as a recog-
nized device for recoupment after payment. VTN Consol., Inc. v. Coastal Eng'r. Assoes., 341
So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Noncontractual or "legal" subrogation is allowed when,
in the court's discretion, it is compelled by the equities. See, e.g., Dantzler Lumber & Ex-
port Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934).
13. 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1980).
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for the initial injury to become subrogated to the plaintiff's entitle-
ment and to file a separate action against a successive tortfeasor
who had caused a subsequent injury aggravating the earlier harm.1'
By permitting third-party relief in instances of successive injuries,
the court extended the reach of the subrogation doctrine beyond
the "same injury" test for contribution and the "all or nothing"
test for indemnity. How far the doctrine reaches, however, is still
uncertain. 15
While acknowledging that these various loss allocation devices
frequently interact, this article will focus on Florida's statutory
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. After reviewing the
case law construing the statute, and the occasional conflict over the
scope of contribution, this article will examine the mechanics of
applying the statute and then address the problematic subject of
release.
II. SCOPE OF STATUTORY CONTRIBUTION
Although the Uniform Contribution Act defines the right of
contribution, the actual scope of that right is far from certain. Sec-
tion 768.31(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more per-
sons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury
to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a
right of contribution among them even though judgment has not
been recovered against all or any of them."6
The statute specifically precludes parties who are liable for
breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations, and reckless, will-
ful, wanton or intentional torts, from seeking contribution." Thus,
to obtain contribution a party must be liable for no more than or-
14. Id. at 704. The supreme court had previously refused to allow third-party claims for
contribution or indemnity against a doctor in similar circumstances. Stuart v. Hertz Corp.,
351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977). By permitting the assertion in a separate action of the subroga-
tion claim based on the doctor's negligence, the supreme court in Underwriters at Lloyds
avoided infusing the burden and complexity of medical malpractice litigation into the in-
jured party's suit for relief.
15. Although the expansive application of equitable subrogation in Underwriters at
Lloyds is a commendable innovation, the supreme court did little to define the equitable
considerations governing its applicability.
16. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1981).
17. Id. § (2)(c), (g); see Nesbitt v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980) (willful, wanton or reckless conduct constitutes intentional tort precluding con-




dinary or gross negligence. Presumably, a defendant charged with
a more culpable tort could still state a claim for contribution by
alleging that, if liable for anything, he is liable only for ordinary
negligence.18
A. "Joint," "Concerted," and "Several" Tortfeasors
Under Florida Statutes section 768.31(2)(a), the right of con-
tribution is available only when "two or more persons become
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property. '" This language suggests that liability for the "same in-
jury" is the determinative test. Thus, contribution does not apply
when different tortfeasors cause successive injuries, because even
though they further aggravate the same condition, they do not
cause the same injury.20 By posing joint and several liability as al-
ternatives, however, the statute apparently does not require joint
action by tortfeasors as long as there is a common injury that gives
rise to at least several liability. Nonetheless, cases construing the
provision require some interrelation among acts by fellow
tortfeasors to sustain an action for contribution, even though
"split-second timing" is not mandated."1
In VTN Consolidated, Inc. v. Coastal Engineering Associ-
ates," for example, the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
denied contribution to a wrongdoer even though his wrongful acts
had combined with the acts of another potentially liable party to
cause a single injury. The plaintiff in VTN, a land development
company, had obtained designs for a street and drainage system
from an engineering firm. When problems developed with the de-
18. Johnson v. Ludwig, 328 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In Johnson, the court al-
lowed a defendant charged with wanton conduct to seek contribution since he might have
been liable for mere negligence. Id. at 37; cf. Bodin Apparel, Inc. v. Superior Steam Serv.,
Inc., 328 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (allegation of active negligence against defen-
dant does not preclude that defendant from laterasserting a claim for indemnity).
19. FLA. STAT. § 768.312(2)(a) (1981).
20. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1977). If an initial tortfeasor causes
one injury, which is then aggravated by the negligence of a different tortfeasor, the initial
tortfeasor may now use the doctrine of equitable subrogation in place of indemnity or con-
tribution to recover from the second tortfeasor damages paid for the additional harm. See
text accompanying notes 12-15, supra; Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,
382 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1980). The situation of successive injuries differs from cases in which
successive acts contribute to a single, indivisible injury. See, e.g., Leesburg Hosp. Ass'n v.
Carter, 321 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
21. Leesburg Hosp. Ass'n v. Carter, 321 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
22. 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1977). The
court also held that VTN was not entitled to indemnification from the engineers. Id. at 228-
29.
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signs, the development company sued the surveyor that had origi-
nally prepared the topographical maps used by the engineers in
drawing the plans for the plaintiff. The surveyor, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint against the engineers, alleging that they had
failed to propertly use the topographical maps. Because the plain-
tiff claimed that the negligent design of the street and drainage
systems caused its losses, there apparently was a single injury
caused by the acts of the surveyor and the engineers.2
In refusing to allow the defendant-surveyor to bring the en-
gineering firm into the suit as a person liable for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim, 4 the Second District denied the surveyor's claim
for contribution. The court examined the relationship between the
conduct of the surveyor and the engineers, not the commonality of
injury caused by their separate acts.2 5 The court stated that "the
claim for contribution must be related to the original cause of ac-
tion-it must arise out of the same transaction or series of transac-
tions. ' '2 6 Apparently focusing on the fact that the topographical
maps were prepared two years before the engineers allegedly mis-
used them, the court held that they were not part of the same se-
ries of transactions.2 7 The Second District thus appears to have en-
grafted a transactional, or time-proximity, test upon a statutory
standard that ostensibly could have been met by merely showing
the "same injury. ' ' 8
A similar transactional predicate for contribution issued from
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Sun Bank.2 9 In Touche Ross, the plaintiff-hospital sued an ac-
counting firm for failing the uncover an embezzlement of hospital
funds. The accounting firm subsequently sought contribution from
Sun Bank for improperly negotiating and honoring the checks
withdrawing funds from the hospital's accounts.30 These facts
clearly present a single injury because the hospital's loss consisted
of embezzled funds paid pursuant to the alleged wrongful honor of
23. 341 So. 2d at 226-27.
24. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
25. 341 So. 2d at 228-29.
26. Id. at 229.
27. Id.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1981). In general, use of "or" requires only one of the
accompanying alternatives to be met. "In its elementary sense, the word 'or' is a disjunctive
particle [sic] that marks an alternative, generally corresponding to 'either,' as 'either this or
that'; a connective that marks an alternative." Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Bryan, 93 Fla. 413, 425, 111 So. 801, 805 (1927).
29. 366 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).




Despite this evidence of a single injury, the Third District af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the accounting firm's contribution
claim against the bank. Citing VTN Consolidated, Inc. v. Coastal
Engineering Associates, the Third District stated that the ac-
counting firm and the bank were "not exposed to [the hospital]
under the 'same set of circumstances.' ",i While conceding that
there was an overlap in the damage caused by the two tortfeasers,
the court ruled that contribution was unavailable because the hos-
pital's damages "were in no way the result and/or outcome of ei-
ther joint or concurrent actions on the part of the parties hereto.
'8 2
The Second District had placed a slightly different emphasis
on the "single injury" test in Leesburg Hospital Association v.
Carter,33 a case that preceded VTN and Touche Ross. In Leesburg
Hospital, a patient sued a hospital for malpractice, alleging that
hospital personnel had ignored her worsening symptoms after she
arrived for treatment. The hospital brought a third-party contribu-
tion claim against the physician who had examined her when her
condition deteriorated, but who allegedly abandoned her to per-
form surgery on a different patient.3 4 The Second District allowed
the hospital's contribution claim, noting that no demonstrable sep-
aration in time and effect existed between the hospital's acts and
those of the doctor. Although acknowledging the possibility that
the alleged tortfeasors' acts "did not precisely coincide in time,"
the court held that "nevertheless their acts combined to produce a
single injury."35
The court's holding in Leesburg Hospital does not suggest
that there must be concerted action on the part of wrongdoers to
sustain a contribution claim. Its dicta implies, however, that al-
though negligent acts might be wholly independent, contribution
requires the wrongful acts to occur with some proximity in time,
although not with "split-second timing." Accordingly, this ruling
31. Id. (quoting VTN Consl., Inc. v. Coastal Eng'r Assocs., 341 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1976)). The District Court of Appeal, First District, distinguished both VTN Consi.,
Inc. and Touche Ross & Co. in Salley v. Charles R. Perry Const., Inc., 403 So. 2d 556, 557
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The court found that an architect and a general contractor participat-
ing on the same project satisfied both "common enterprise" criteria and owed a common
duty "intertwined in both time and substance."
32. Id. at 468.
33. 321 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
34. Id. at 433-34.
35. Id. at 435.
36. Id.
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is not inconsistent with the Second District's subsequent opinion
in VTN, which concluded that acts separated by two years were
not part of the same series of transactions under the contribution
statute. On the other hand, the Leesburg Hospital analysis less
easily accommodates Touche Ross because the former required
only some proximity in time; the latter demanded joint or con-
certed action.
Whether these cases create a time-proximity requirement or a
joint-action requirement, they demonstrate a judicially engrafted
addition to the statutory requisites for contribution. On its face,
the intent of the statute is to facilitate equitable contribution and
loss distribution.3 7 To promote this goal, courts should use only the
express statutory requirement of "same injury," whether there is
joint or several liability. Cases such as VTN, Touche Ross, and
Leesburg Hospital, which impose further requirements on the stat-
ute's single-injury test, obviously compromise that purpose.
A time-proximity requirement is difficult to justify in either
analytical or policy terms. For purposes of contribution, the fact
that a party designs plans two years rather than two days before
they are implemented should be irrelevant. For example, under the
VTN rationale, an architect whose plans are stored for a few years
might have no right of contribution against a contractor should the
building's owner sue the architect for latent construction defects,
because the plans and the construction would not arise from the
"same transaction." On the other hand, had the general contractor
used three-day-old designs rather than plans drawn two years ear-
lier, a court could find him liable for contribution.
For purposes of defining "single injury" under the Uniform
Contribution Act, distinctions among wrongful acts based upon
time or concerted action are illogical. If two different parties are
liable for the same injury, the interrelation of their wrongful acts is
irrelevant to the principles of fairness and loss distribution that
prompted the development of contribution doctrines and statutes.
Ostensibly guided by these principles, but without detailing its
reasoning, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, declined
to require either concerted or sequential acts in allowing contribu-
tion. In Moore v. St. Cloud Utilities,8 a minor was injured when
he touched a live power line. The injury occurred after the driver
of the car in which the minor was a passenger stopped to assist the
37. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(c) (1981).
38. 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
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occupants of another vehicle that had slammed into and toppled a
utility pole. The court concluded that the driver of the minor's car,
the driver of the car that hit the pole, and the utility company
were jointly liable for the minor's injuries and therefore subject to
contribution claims among themselvesA9 Here, no defendant had
acted in concert with any other. Moreover, the wrongful conduct
was not necessarily concurrent. Indeed, the utility company's al-
leged negligence in designing the electrical power pole might have
occurred years before the accident. The Fourth District neverthe-
less affirmed the availability of contribution.
The Second District has also squarely rejected any need for
"concerted action" among fellow tortfeasors as a predicate for con-
tribution. In Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,0
the court allowed a railroad company to seek contribution from a
shipper after the railroad company had been held liable for injuries
to one of its employees under the Federal Employers Liability
Act. 1 The railroad company could require contribution from the
shipper under the Uniform Contribution Act because "[e]ven in
the absence of concerted action . . . there was a jury question on
whether the negligent acts of the parties combined to become the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury" to the employee.
The joint tortfeasors in Sol Walker acted in close physical and
time proximity. The court's narrow holding, therefore, presents no
necessary conflict with the restrictive approaches to contribution
taken in VTN and Touche Ross.48 Yet the court's liberal analysis
of contribution, although dictum, may well be inconsistent with
those cases. The Sol Walker court emphasized not the interrela-
tionship of acts among tortfeasors, but rather the common liability
created by such acts: "[T]he theory of contribution 'among
tortfeasors is predicated upon the fact that all are legally liable to
respond in damages to an injured party because of their wrongful
act."44 The court's language flatly rejecting any need for coficerted
action is clearly at odds with Touche Ross. Furthermore, by stating
the test for contribution as depending simply on whether the de-
fendants' acts made them liable for the same injury, the Second
39. Id. at 984.
40. 362 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
41. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
42. 362 So. 2d at 50.
43. In Sol Walker, the court ultimately held that the railroad company's claim for con-
tribution was precluded by the judgment that had been entered upon the directed verdict in
favor of the shipper in the initial action brought by the employee. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 50.
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District apparently declined to follow other decisions that en-
grafted additional requirements on the contribution statute. By re-
quiring no more than the statute directs, the Sol Walker decision
faithfully meets the statutory terms. Moreover, by making contri-
bution more readily accessible, the Second District advances the
statute's policy encouraging loss distribution and sharing.
B. Common Liability
In addition to the "joint," "several," and "same injury" termi-
nology of section 768.31(2)(a), the Uniform Contribution Act con-
tains several references to "common liability, 4'5 beginning with the
statement in section 768.31(2)(b) that "[t]he right of contribution
exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro
rata share of the common liability . ,,. "" As a result, several de-
cisions have held that contribution is available only if defendants
have a common liability to the injured party, although the basis of
each defendant's liability may be unique.47 Other cases, however,
without analyzing "common liability," have authorized contribu-
tion among parties when it was clear that not all were "legally lia-
ble to respond in damages to an injured party because of their
wrongful act. ' 48 Although these decisions provide rules governing
limited circumstances, no clear rule can be drawn from them that
will yield a consistent analysis and accurately predict future
results.
In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Smith, 9 the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal of a railroad company's ac-
tion seeking contribution from the employer of an accident victim.
When the injured employee sued the railroad for compensation,
the railroad filed a third-party contribution claim against the
plaintiff's employer, which had previously paid workmen's com-
pensation benefits to the plaintiff. Because the workmen's compen-
sation laws barred the plaintiff from suing his employer, the court
held that no common liability to the injured man existed between
45. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b), 4(d)(1), (2) (1981); see notes 74-79 and accompanying text
infra.
46. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1981).
47. E.g., Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45, 51 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978). See also Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So. 2d 82, 85-86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
48. Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978).
49. 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978).
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the railroad and the employer. "The key words of the contribution
act [section 768.31] are 'common liability' to the employee. Such
'common liability' cannot exist where the employer is immunized
from liability by the Compensation Act for tort." 0 Thus, contribu-
tion was not available to the railroad. The court further said that
contribution rights arise only when codefendants have a "common
tort liability" to an injured party.' 1
The District Court of Appeal, First District, is equally clear in
its emphasis on the "common liability" requirement. In Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss,"5 a case arising before the Uni-
form Contribution Act took effect in Florida," the victim of an au-
tomobile accident sued two culpable truck drivers and the insur-
ance company of one of the truck drivers. When the trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of one of the truck drivers, the
other defendants (the second truck driver and his insurance com-
pany, Liberty Mutual) paid the plaintiff a settlement." Liberty
Mutual then sued the exonerated defendant, Curtiss, for contribu-
tion." The First District ruled that Liberty Mutual did not have a
cause of action for contribution against Curtiss because he had al-
ready been exonerated from liability by a competent court."
Because Liberty Mutual had participated in the litigation in
which Curtiss was exonerated, the court could have reached its re-
sult through res judicata or related principles.'7 Instead, the court
50. Id. at 429.
51. "We have heretofore said, and repeat here, that indemnity is bottomed on entirely
different considerations from contribution. The latter arises only when there is a common
tort liability to the injured person." Id. See also Armor Elevator Co. v. Elevator Sales &
Serv., Inc., 360 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
52. 327 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
53. See id. at 84 n.1.
54. Id. at 83-84.
55. The accident had taken place in Georgia; three persons were injured. Id. at 83. The
plaintiff-victim in Curtiss brought his action in Florida's Circuit Court for the Fourth Judi-
cial Circuit. Although Georgia law controlled the victim's cause of action against the defen-
dants and Liberty Mutual's contribution claim against Curtiss, Florida law determined the
effect of the Florida judgment exonerating Curtiss on Liberty Mutual's contribution claim.
Id. at 84.
56. Id. at 85.
57. Id. at 84-86. See also Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d at
52.
Although courts have generally acknowledged the applicability of res judicata analysis
to contribution, it may be difficult to justify in cases in which a possible claim is not pleaded
for tactical or other reasons. Generally, res judicata applies only to matters that a party is
obligated to litigate in a particular action. Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 7 So. 2d
143 (1942).
Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, cross-claims, the vehicle for asserting con-
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based its holding on the principle that a defendant who has been
properly absolved of liability logically cannot share a common lia-
bility with another defendant: "[t]he issue is [not] whether Liberty
Mutual has had its day in court on the issue of Curtiss' liability. It
is simpler than that. . . .Curtiss shared no common liability with
Liberty Mutual.
'58
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, ruled
in 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa59 that the lack of common liability
defeated a defendant's contribution claim against the parents of a
child who was injured by the defendant's negligence. Because the
family tort immunity doctrine would bar an action by the child
against his parents, the court held that the parents did not share a
common liability with the defendant, even though the parents'
negligence had allegedly contributed to the child's injury. 0
Despite such clear interpretations of common liability in both
supreme court and district court rulings, the Supreme Court of
Florida reached a squarely contrary result in a case involving inter-
spousal tort immunity. In Shor v. Paoli,61 the court allowed a
tortfeasor to seek contribution from the spouse of the injured
plaintiff. The plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by his
wife, was injured when their automobile collided with the defen-
dant's vehicle. The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the
other driver, who then sought contribution against the plaintiff's
wife, claiming she was negligent in her operation of the plaintiff's
automobile.6 2 Without discussing the common liability require-
ment, the supreme court allowed the contribution claim against
the plaintiff's wife.6 3 The plaintiff's wife was unquestionably im-
mune from liability to the plaintiff under the doctrine of inter-
tribution among codefendants, are never mandatory. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g). See also H.
TRAWICK, JR., TRAWICK'S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 12-6, at 188 (1979 ed.). Res
judicata, accordingly, should not be a bar to a subsequent contribution claim that was avail-
able as a cross-claim in an earlier action. The related doctrines of estoppel by judgment or
collateral estoppel may be more properly applicable, at least when codefendants actually
litigate adversely to each other. E.g., Corn v. Hoffman, 230 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).
The Uniform Contribution Act presently addresses this issue only to the extent that the
tortfeasors participated in the original action. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f) (1981). If one such
tortfeasor was not a party to the earlier proceeding, he is plainly not bound by either res
judicata or estoppel by judgment principles. E.g., Burleigh House Condominium, Inc. v.
Buchwald, 368 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
58. 327 So. 2d at 85-86.
59. 369 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
60. Id. at 407.
61. 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).




spousal tort immunity; thus, the plaintiff's wife and the defendant
shared no common liability. Equitable considerations, such as un-
just enrichment, apparently prompted this analytically flawed
decision."'
Analytically, there is no reason why the Supreme Court of
Florida should distinguish a "common liability" defeated by inter-
spousal tort immunity from a "common liability" overridden by
the family tort immunity doctrine or workmen's compensation
laws. But the court's decision in Shor is not necessarily inauspi-
cious, for it eliminates one inequitable obstacle to common liability
that operates to extinguish contribution. Others remain. For exam-
ple, a fortunate tortfeasor might escape liability to the plaintiff be-
cause the plaintiff failed to comply with discovery or omitted an
essential element in his case. If the plaintiff later pursued a differ-
ent tortfeasor, this new defendant could be precluded from seeking
contribution against the earlier, luckier defendant, who had es-
caped liability because of the plaintiff's procedural errors. The lat-
ter defendant would no longer share any common liability with the
plaintiff.
Similarly, should an injured party delay suing a tortfeasor un-
til the statute of limitations has almost elapsed, that tortfeasor is
arguably barred from seeking contribution from any joint
tortfeasors once the period of limitation expires on the plaintiff's
claim. The third-party defendant could argue that once the plain-
tiff's claim against him is tolled by the statute of limitations, he is
shielded from contribution because he shares no common liability
to the plaintiff with the initial defendant. Although most jurisdic-
tions have rejected such an argument, no Florida case has decided
whether a time bar will be effective against a contribution claim."
64. Florida is among the minority of states that adhere to the common law doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity; Florida courts show no signs of abandoning the rule. See, e.g.,
Heaton v. Heaton, 304 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), citing Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d
774 (Fla. 1950).
65. See note 47 supra, and authorities cited therein. In light of the consensus from the
other jurisdictions, it appears likely that Florida will also allow a third-party contribution
claim after the statute of limitations period expires on the underlying claim. See Kelekut X-
Ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Adams v. Valequier, 48 F. Supp.
275 (W.D. Pa. 1942); Go1dsberry v. Frank Clendaniel, Inc., 49 Del. 69, 109 A.2d 405 (1954);
McGlone v. Corbi, 59 N.J. 86, 97, 279 A.2d 812, 817 (1971); Cooper v. Philadelphia Dairy
Prod. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 301, 308, 112 A.2d 308, 314 (1955); Wnek v. Boyle, 374 Pa. 27, 30,
96 A.2d 857, 858 (1953); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Trans. Co., 190 Va. 851, 858, 59 S.E.2d
121, 123 (1950). See also Comment, supra note 2, at 712.
In dictum, one Florida court recently concluded that the expiration of a limitations
period on the original plaintiff's claim would not bar contribution. Showell Indus., Inc. v.
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To harmonize Florida decisions, and to facilitate analysis in
future holdings, the present contribution requirement of "common
liability" should be discarded. The wording of the statute does not
necessarily establish it as a component of contribution. Using
"common liability" as a prerequisite to contribution promises little
benefit in exchange for possible analytic confusion.e
The holdings in Smith67 (workmen's compensation) and Lib-
erty Mutual" (exoneration of a codefendant) are not inconsistent
with this suggestion. These holdings, analyzed in accordance with
the doctrinal underpinnings of contribution, make sense without
reference to the concept of common liability. To allow contribution
against an employer protected under workmen's compensation
laws would infringe on the policies underlying the compensation
acts and create a discordant juxtaposition of compensation laws
against the Uniform Contribution Act.6" Furthermore, constructing
a "common liability" requirement to protect an exonerated defen-
Holmes County, 409 So. 2d 78 (Fla. lt DCA 1982).
In a well-reasoned analysis of this issue, Professor Peter B. Kutner agrees with the
position taken by the courts and commentators criticizing the draftsmen of the Uniform
Contribution Act for not providing a definition of "common liability." Kutner, Contribution
Among Tortfeasors: The Effects of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations, 33
OKLA. L. REV. 203, 212 (1980). Kutner also reviews the impact of the statute of limitations
on contribution claims when the statutes have different time limitations for different classes
of defendants. Should an injured party sue defendant A three years after the injury, Profes-
sor Kutner reasons that A could assert contribution against defendant B, against whom a
two-year period would ordinarily apply. Id. at 218-22. Florida's two-year limitation for pro-
fessional malpractice could well present such a problem in view of the four-year limitation
for negligent non-professionals. Compare FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a),(b) (1981) with FLA. STAT.
§ 95.11(3) (1981).
66. Professor Kutner suggests several interpretations of common liability. Kutner,
supra note 65, at 212. A Rhode Island court has held that common liability exists for pur-
poses of contribution irrespective of procedural barriers such as interspousal immunity. Zar-
rella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I. 1966). See also Comment, Right of Contribution is
Not Barred by Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity in Florida, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 167
(1979). There are two major difficulties with this holding. First, defenses such as immunity
or privilege, like other affirmative defenses, are generally considered substantive rights. See
Avila South Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 608 (Fla. 1977). See also
1A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.310, at 3139-44 (1981) (state law governs these
matters). Second, it is difficult to understand why interspousal immunity is more procedural
in nature than the family immunity doctrine or the employer immunity created by work-
men's compensation laws. Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C.
1951); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978). See also 3-M
Elec. Corp. v. Vigoa, 369 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
67. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978).
68. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
69. In describing the importance of workmen's compensation laws to an employer's tort
immunity, the Supreme Court of Florida said: "Such immunity is the heart and soul of
[workmen's compensation laws]." Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d at 429.
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dant from contribution is unnecessary; res judicata principles
achieve the same result.70 A common liability requirement is not
only unnecessary as a decisionmaking tool, it will actually cause
incongruous results if faithfully followed. In Shor v. Paoli,7' the
Supreme Court of Florida simply ignored the "common liability"
requirement in order to reach a just result. A common liability re-
quirement should be similarly discarded in certain other situations
where contribution is sought. A party whose claim against an exon-
erated defendant was never really litigated should not be barred
from contribution against the defendant. It would also be unfair to
deny contribution to a defendant against a prospective third-party
defendant because the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute
of limitations. Such an unjust result is not compelled by the legis-
lative intent underlying the Uniform Contribution Act, but it
would be nonetheless mandated if the defendant and the third-
party defendants were required to share a "common liability" to
the plaintiff.
The haphazard application of "common liability" in contribu-
tion cases is an evil that can be extinguished. Rather than simply
ignoring the common liability issue to achieve a just result, the
courts should be intellectually honest and pointedly discard any
such requirement. In the purest situation, when an alleged
tortfeasor is exonerated after a trial on the merits, collateral estop-
pel will protect him from contribution. When there is no trial at
all, or only a procedural decision, the question of his responsibility
for the injury remains open. If, in a subsequent contribution suit,
he is shown to be a wrongdoer, he should contribute to the com-
pensation of the injured party. Workmen's compensation cases are
entitled to special treatment because of the public policy inherent
in workmen's compensation laws; an employer's immunity from li-
ability in industrial accidents is the essence of workmen's compen-
sation laws.72 Thus, the employer should be immune from contri-
bution claims as well.
70. To the extent that a party does not litigate against a codefendant, any exoneration
of the codefendant from liability will not create a common law bar to contribution under
principles of res judicata or even estoppel by judgment. See note 41 supra. Under Florida's
Uniform Contribution Act, codefendants are bound, for purposes of contribution, by the
judgment of the court exonerating any defendant from liability. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f)
(1981).
71. 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1978); see text accompanying notes 61-64 supra; see also Com-
ment, supra note 66, at 175 (criticizing Shor's lack of analysis although agreeing with its
result).
72. See note 69 supra.
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The operative terms of the Uniform Contribution Act allow
contribution when persons are "jointly or severally liable in tort for
the same injury to person or property. . . .7 Significantly, the Act
speaks to liability for the "same injury" rather than for the
tortfeasors' "common liability" to the plaintiff. Its wording plainly
allows for a broader scope of contribution than is permitted by
"common liability" to plaintiff. A defendant and a prospective
third-party defendant can both be responsible for the same injury
to the plaintiff even though only the defendant may be legally lia-
ble. The defendants would share no "common liability to the in-
jured party," but because the acts of both caused the plaintiff's
injuries, both should be liable for the "same injury."
Concededly, several references to "common liability" appear
in the subsections following the initial definitional provision of the
Uniform Contribution Act.7 4 In this context, however, common lia-
bility should be construed to mean liability for a single injury
rather than concurrent legal liability to the plaintiff. Any different
construction would render other provisions in the Act superflu-
ous. 7  For example, section 768.31(5)(b) protects a defendant re-
leased by the plaintiff against contribution claims by codefend-
ants.7 6 Because a released defendant has no common liability to
the plaintiff, an express provision immunizing him from contribu-
tion implies that the absence of common liability does not, by it-
self, defeat contribution. Similarly, section 768.31(4)(f) explicitly
absolves from contribution a defendant who has been exonerated
of the plaintiff's claim.7 8 This defendant would plainly have no
common liability to the injured party. By specifically setting forth
this immunity, the Act implies that it was not otherwise available.
By these inferences, immunity from contribution does not invari-
ably accompany absence of common liability.
Accordingly, the provisions of the Uniform Contribution Act,
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1981).
74. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1981) defines the right to contribution. Subsections 2(b),
and 4(d)(1) and (2) refer to common liability.
75. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f), (5)(b) (1981). See Pinellas County v. Woolly, 189 So. 2d
217, 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) ("[W]ords in a statute should not be construed as
surplusage.").
76. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (1981).
77. Florida courts recognize this maxim of construction: "We have oft-times held that
the rule 'Expresio unius est exclusio alterius' is applicable in connection with the statutory
construction." Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952). See also Graham v.
Azar, 204 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1967); O'Brian Assocs. v. Tully, 184 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1966).
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f) (1981).
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when read in pari materia (as any statute must be),7 9 support the
conclusion that tortfeasors need not have a common legal liability
to the plaintiff for contribution to lie. Any such requirement cre-
ates doctrinal inconsistency as well as incongruity in policy and
should, therefore, be discarded by Florida courts.
III. MECHANICS OF CONTRIBUTION
A. Procedure for Asserting Contribution Under the Uniform
Contribution Act
Contribution may be asserted in any of several ways under the
Uniform Contribution Act. A defendant may cross-claim against a
codefendant already in the action,80 or, if the plaintiff did not sue
the prospective contribution defendant, the initial defendant may
join the prospective contribution defendant by a third-party com-
plaint."1 Alternatively, within thirty days after final judgment, a
defendant can seek contribution against a codefendant on motion
to the trial court."2 Indeed, in Best Sanitary Disposal Co. v. Little
Food Town, Inc.,85 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
approved a post-judgment motion for contribution by a defendant
that had voluntarily dismissed its cross-claim for contribution
prior to trial. On the other hand, contribution will be denied if the
joint tortfeasors from whom contribution is sought were dropped
or dismissed as parties before the motion was filed."
Finally, a party may institute an independent action for con-
tribution within one year after final judgment is rendered in the
79. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 377 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 1979). Another rule of statu-
tory construction favoring a limited, flexible definition of common liability is the maxim
abhorring any "[clonstruction of a statute which would lead to an absurd result." McKibben
v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1974); Winter v. Playa del Sol, Inc., 353 So. 2d 598, 599
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
80. Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So. 2d 2, 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), a/f'd, 389 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1980); cf. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
(defendant may not cross-claim against settling codefendant). See also FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.170(g).
81. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Petrik, 343 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Mount
Sinai Hosp. v. Mora, 342 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); VTN Consol., Inc. v. Costal
Eng'r Assocs., 341 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332
So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fouts, 323 So. 2d 593, 594
(Fla. 2d DCA 1975). See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
82. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(b) (1981). See also Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis,
371 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 355 So.
2d 208, 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347 So. 2d 1085, 1086
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
83. 339 So. 2d 222, 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
84. Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378, 1385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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main action."s If the defendant seeking contribution has "dis-
charged by payment the common liability" (i.e., settled) before the
entry of judgment, he must similarly initiate his claim for contri-
bution within one year after payment.81
B. Apportionment
Following the promulgation of the Uniform Contribution Act,
Florida courts initially rejected any apportionment of relative fault
among joint tortfeasors.87 Therefore, even if a jury believed one co-
defendant to be far more culpable than the other, each would be
equally liable to the plaintiff for damages. Moreover, the less negli-
gent tortfeasor could obtain no more than a pro rata recoupment
from the more culpable codefendant. Thus, irrespective of their
degree of fault, each codefendant would share equally in the
consequences."8
85. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Zack Co., 374 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979);
Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Mount
Sinai Hosp. v. Mora, 342 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In Johns-Manville, the
court said a party seeking contribution must "either file in the original action brought by
plaintiff by a motion for contribution prior to the expiration of thirty days after any final
judgment . . . or commence a separate action within one year of the rendition of the final
judgment if the moving party does not take an appeal." 371 So. 2d at 1151. The court added
that an unsuperseded appeal taken by one defendant would not toll the one year limitation
period for the nonappealing defendant. Id. at 1151 n.1.
86. FLA. STAT. § 768.314(d)(1), (2) (1981). The Act distinguishes between settlements
paid when no action is pending, and settlement after suit is filed. In the former situation,
any nonlitigated settlement must be paid within the limitations period of the claimant's
right of action. Although no Florida contribution case has yet decided the issue, any such
party seeking contribution must generally show the reasonableness of the settlement. E.g.,
W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
This is the rule in Florida respecting indemnity claims, except where an indemnity defen-
dant has prior notice of and opportunity to participate in settlement of the underlying
claim. Atlantic Coast Dev. Corp. v. Napolean Steel Contractors, 385 So. 2d 676, 681 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980). In that event, the indemnity defendant, and presumably a contribution defen-
dant, is bound by the sum of settlement in the absence of fraud or collusion. Id.
87. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 392 (Fla. 1975). See, e.g., Moore v. St. Cloud
Utils., 337 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (court reversed trial court's apportionment
of 20%, 20%, 35%, and 25% among four joint tortfeasors). Most statutes authorizing con-
tribution continue to prorate liability among tortfeasors rather than assess their damages
according to relative fault. Comment, supra note 2, at 695.
88. Comment, supra note 2, at 695. But see Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347
So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In Van Eyck, the Third District affirmed a trial court's
80%/20% allocation of liability between codefendants based on the Act's direction that
"[p]rinciples of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply." Id. at 1086 (citing
FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(c) (1975)). The court's decision preceded the legislative amendment
authorizing apportionment according to relative fault. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168 (codified in
FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1981)). Arguably, the equitable power of apportionment upheld in
Van Eyck was retained following the 1977 legislative modification.
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A 1976 amendment to Florida Uniform Contribution Act abro-
gated the case law prohibiting any assessment of comparative fault
among tortfeasors.89 A court may now apportion the relative per-
centage of fault among defendants for purposes of contribution, ei-
ther upon special jury interrogatories or through its own post-
verdict findings.90 In Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Kernin,91 for exam-
ple, a jury found that one of three codefendants was only twenty-
percent liable for the plaintiff's injuries and that the other two co-
defendants were eighty-percent liable.2 Based on these findings,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the defen-
dant that was twenty-percent liable could recover from its code-
fendants any sums it had paid the plaintiff in excess of twenty-
percent of the verdict.93 The First District, however, quoted the
trial court in emphasizing that irrespective of the apportionment
of relative fault among defendants for contribution purposes, each
remained fully liable to the plaintiff for the total sum of the
judgment.9 4
C. Exoneration
Section 768.31(4)(f) of the Uniform Contribution Act now pro-
vides that a finding by the trier of fact that one defendant is not
liable to the plaintiff is binding on all the defendants in determin-
ing their contribution rights.' 5 The District Courts of Appeal for
the First and Second Districts differed on exoneration prior to the
effective date of this provision. The First District in Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss," ruled that unless codefendants ac-
tually raise contribution claims in the underlying action, res judi-
cata will not block subsequent attempts to seek contribution
against a defendant exonerated of liability.9 7 The Second District,
on the other hand, held in Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast
89. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168 (codified in FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1981)); see also
Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 708, 711 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Ken-
nedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347 So. 2d at 1086 n.1.
90. Compare Lincenburg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 393 (Fla. 1975) and Vigilant Ins. Co.
v. Keiser, 391 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) with Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Van Eyck, 347
So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
91. 391 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
92. Id. at 707-08.
93. Id. at 713.
94. Id. at 709.
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f) (1981), as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186; see Sol
Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
96. 327 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
97. Id. at 85.
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Line Railroad" that res judicata bars subsequent contribution
claims if the codefendants in the previous trial "did actually liti-
gate adversely," irrespective of whether adverse claims are actually
filed." The only aspect of exoneration not addressed by the Act is
its applicability to claims by persons not joined in the original ac-
tion. Because the Act expressly immunizes exonerated defendants
from subsequent contribution claims, the reasoning of Liberty Mu-
tual suggests that even if a joint tortfeasor had no opportunity to
participate in the original litigation, he would be unable to obtain
contribution from a previously exonerated defendant. The Liberty
Mutual court emphasized that contribution requires "common lia-
bility." 100 If an original defendant is exonerated of liability to the
plaintiff, then he does not share a "common liability" to the plain-
tiff with any subsequent defendant and is thus immune to contri-
bution claims. The defendant denied contribution in Liberty Mu-
tual had, however, been a party to the action exonerating its
codefendant, thus the court's statement is only dictum.
As discussed above,101 it is unfair to construe the term "com-
mon liability" to defeat a subsequent defendant's contribution
claim when developments beyond his control have defeated the
plaintiff's claim against the original defendant. Such a construction
of "common liability" would be especially inequitable if applied to
one having no chance to participate in the original exoneration of
his fellow tortfeasors. Although the Uniform Contribution Act does
not address exoneration of nonparticipants in the original action,
courts should construe the Act to forbid such a result. The Act
makes the plaintiff's judgment binding "as among such defen-
dants" participating in the suit.10 2 In dictum, one court has sug-
gested that this explicit reference to participating defendants im-
plies that exoneration is inapplicable to nonparticipants.108 With
the scope of exoneration so delimited by the legislature, the courts
should not broaden the effect of a judgment. The Supreme Court
of Florida recently resolved a conflict among the district courts
when it held that defendants may appeal the exoneration of a co-
defendant that substantially affects their rights against the code-
98. 362 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
99. Id. at 51.
100. 327 So. 2d at 85-86.
101. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(f) (1981).




fendant. 104 This right exists even if the defendants appealing the
exoneration did not not previously assert a claim for
contribution. 10
IV. RELEASE
The effect of a release on the right to contribution is problem-
atic. Under the Uniform Contribution Act, a plaintiff's release of
one joint tortfeasor generates consequences fundamentally differ-
ent from those arising at common law. 0 6
A. Release of One Tortfeasor Does Not of Itself Release Others
Florida's Uniform Contribution Act specifically provides that
a plaintiff's release of one tortfeasor does not discharge other joint
tortfeasors from liability.10 7 This provision abrogates the common
law rule under which the release of one joint tortfeasor released
all.10
8
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Florida examined
the effect of the Act on a printed general release clause. In Hurt v.
Leatherby Insurance Co.,109 the court held that a general release
by a claimant of one defendant, as well as "any other person...
which might be charged with responsibilities for injury,"" 0 did not,
as a matter of law, absolve remaining joint tortfeasors. Whether a
104. Pensacola Interstate Fair, Inc. v. Popovich, 389 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 1980). The
District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, has held that an order dismissing a cross-claim for
contribution is a nonappealable interlocutory order. Gallo v. Esser, 407 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981).
105. See Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff'd, 389 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1980); Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
106. Eason v. Lau, 369 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1981) provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the
same wrongful death; (a) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it
reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by
the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater; and, (b) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
108. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834, 841 (Fla. 1956).
109. 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980).
110. Id. at 433. The court emphasized that the Uniform Contribution Act authorizes
release of all possible tortfeasors if the terms of the release "so provide." Id. (citing FLA.
STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1979)). The court also instructed, however, that the intent to release
all possible tortfeasors must be clearly manifested on the release.
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printed release effectively discharges other than specifically named
tortfeasors is a question of fact.
B. Effect of Release On A Defendant Who Settles
As long as a settling tortfeasor's settlement was made in good
faith, he is protected from any right of contribution that the re-
maining defendants might subsequently assert against him."' But
he is similarly barred from seeking contribution from them.
Section 768.31(5)(b) of the Act creates the settling defendant's
immunity from contribution. The statutory immunity is anchored
in policy considerations that favor out-of-court settlements.113
Without protection from contribution, the defendant would gain
nothing from a settlement because he would remain liable for con-
tribution to his codefendants for a proportionate share of the
plaintiff's eventual judgment. The prospect that a defendant might
settle, only to find himself thrust back into the case by a codefend-
ant's contribution claim, made it impracticable for a tortfeasor to
settle.113
The Act requires that the codefendant settle in good faith
1 4
to obtain immunity from contribution. The most extensive discus-
sion by a Florida court of the good faith requirement is presented
in Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad.15 In Frier's, de-
fendant Seaboard filed a post-trial motion for conribution against
codefendants Frier's and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany, both of whom had previously settled with the plaintiff pur-
suant to a "Mary Carter" agreement."' Like other Mary Carter
111. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (1981). See Metropolitan Dade County Transit Auth. v.
Simmons, 375 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Gordon, 328 So.
2d 206, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Although a non-settling defendant may have no contribu-
tion rights against the settling party, he is entitled to set-off the amount paid in settlement
against the final adverse judgment. See, e.g., Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378, 1384 (Fla.
3d DCA 1978); Atlantic Ambulance & Convalescent Serv., Inc. v. Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477,
478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1981).
112. See Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979); Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 355 So. 2d 208, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
113. Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 355 So. 2d 208, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
114. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1981).
115. 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
116. Id. at 209-10.
A "Mary Carter" agreement is a secret contract in which one codefendant guarantees a
stipulated minimum recovery to the plaintiff regardless of the outcome of the litigation. The
defendant agrees to proceed to trial as if he were still a genuine adversary, but his liability is
actually limited by the contract, regardless of the verdict. Id. at 210. See generally Ward v.
Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1973); Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978); Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
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agreements, this settlement was reached secretly, decreased the
settling defendant's liability in proportion to the increase in the
non-settling defendants' liability, and guaranteed the plaintiff a
definite recovery from the settling defendant regardless of the
trial's outcome.
1 17
Following the trial, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against
Seaboard in a sum that, by virtue of the Mary Carter agreement,
relieved Frier's and Hartford from any liability. Seaboard success-
fully moved for contribution from the codefendants. Seaboard's
motion for contribution did not, however, allege that the plaintiff
and the other defendants entered into the settlement agreement in
bad faith. Accordingly, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
was presented with the issue of whether using a Mary Carter
agreement to settle establishes a lack of good faith. The First Dis-
trict declined so broad a proclamation. It instead granted Seaboard
leave to amend its motion for contribution to allege a lack of good
faith, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.118 Al-
though the court held that a Mary Carter agreement did not per se
evidence bad faith, it offered no guidelines for determining what
circumstances would demonstrate bad faith.11 '
In one recent case, Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., v. Davis,/0
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, refused to bar contri-
bution against a defendant who had secured a release from the
plaintiff because the release was not given in good faith. In Sobik's
Sandwich Shops, a jury had found three defendants jointly liable
for $83,186.96. Before any of the defendants served notice of ap-
peal, the plaintiffs announced that they would collect their judg-
ment in the same order in which the defendants filed their ap-
peals.121 The plaintiffs' obviously intended to discourage an appeal
of the verdict. The defendants nonetheless appealed, unsuccess-
fully. The plaintiffs then required the defendant who had first ap-
pealed to pay $50,000 for his release; the second defendant paid
$31,984.97, and the third defendant paid only $1,000.12 The first
defendant filed a claim for contribution against the third, alleging
that the release was not given in good faith as required by section
768.31(5) of the Act. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal,
117. 355 So. 2d at 210.
118. Id. at 211-12.
119. Id. at 211.
120. 371 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).
121. Id. at 710.
122. Id.
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the Fourth District held that the release of the third defendant
was not given in good faith.28 To hold otherwise, the court noted,
would allow a claimant to arbitrarily decide how much each
tortfeasor would pay on the basis of which tortfeasor had been
more cooperative.
12 4
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, established a less
exacting standard of good faith in Metropolitan Dade County
Transit Authority v. Simmons.12 5 In Simmons, one codefendant
settled with the plaintiff for $1,000. The other codefendant, Dade
County, refused to settle and ultimately suffered a $60,000 judg-
ment. The Third District affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
settlement was not demonstrably made in good faith.' 16 The Sim-
mons court can be criticized for attaching no significance to the
sixty-to-one disparity between the amount of the judgment and
the sum paid in settlement. A settlement in an amount substan-
tially less than the defendant's pro rata share of the final judgment
should, at the least, impose either a burden to show good faith, or
a rebuttable presumption of bad faith.
Both Simmons and Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line Rail-
road 1 7 effectively eliminate any requirement that the settling co-
defendant demonstrate his good faith to ensure immunity from
contribution. Instead, these cases place the burden on the nonset-
tling defendant to prove that the settlement was made in bad
faith. Unfortunately, shifting the burden of proof in this manner
could lead to unfairness. Because the statutory immunity from
contribution liability substantially benefits the settling defendant,
he should be the party with the duty to show good faith. If "good
faith settlement" is, in substance, an affirmative defense, then or-
dinary principles of pleading and evidence require that the party
asserting a good faith settlement bear the burden of proof."8
It is difficult for one party to prove the bad faith of another.
Whichever defendant the plaintiff selects for settlement could,
therefore, easily satisfy the Simmons standard irrespective of the
sums paid in settlement. By allowing the plaintiff unfettered dis-
cretion to select the codefendant to whom he may grant an easy
123. Id. at 711-12.
124. Id. at 711.
125. 375 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
126. Id. at 859. But see River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d
986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972) (unreasonably low settlement as an indication of bad faith).
127. 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
128. E.g., Hough v. Menses, 95 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1957).
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settlement, courts once again make the plaintiff "'lord of his ac-
tion' [who], when injured by the joint and several tort of two or
more, may place the loss where and how he sees fit."12 The contri-
bution doctrine arose to combat such private, instead of judicial,
control over distribution of loss.130
Judicial standards for measuring good faith would provide an
adequate safeguard from settlement abuses. So far, Florida courts
have offered no general guidelines, but instead have merely deter-
mined whether particular circumstances constitute bad faith as a
matter of law. One California decision"' relied upon by the First
District in Frier's suggested several criteria for determining good
faith. These include the settling party's solvency, the strengths or
weaknessness of its defenses, the overall value of the plaintiff's
claim, and the amount of the settlement. Although this listing is
far from exhaustive, it indicates that appropriate standards can be
formulated to guide the trial court through this critical
determination.
Another issue raised by the release of the settling defendant is
whether he may obtain contribution against nonsettling defen-
dants in the event his settlement exceeds a pro rata share of the
ultimate judgment. Section 768.31(2)(d) of Florida's Uniform Con-
tribution Act provides that a settling defendant "is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the
injury or wrongful doing is not extinguished by the settlement.'"I '
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, applied this provi-
sion strictly in Best Sanitary Disposal Co. v. Little Food Town,
Inc., 33 in which the defendant Little Food Town paid $45,000 to
the plaintiff in exchange for a release of its liability. The plaintiff
did not release the remaining defendant, Best Sanitary, which pro-
ceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict of $45,000. Because the
plaintiff had already received that sum when it settled with Little
Food Town, he could only obtain court costs from Best Sanitary.
Thereafter, Little Food Town successfully sued Best Sanitary for
129. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
130. See UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 3, at 61 (1975).
131. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr.
498 (1972); see Comment, Sliding Scale Agreements and the Good Faith Requirement of
Settlement Negotiations, 12 PAC. L.J. 121, 142 (1980) (citing Stambaugh v. Superior Court,
62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976) (suggests California decisions have diluted
significance of good faith test). In Stambaugh, the court presumed good faith absent "rare
cases of collusion or bad faith." 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
132. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(d) (1981).
133. 339 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
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contribution, arguing that Little Food Town's $45,000 settlement
payment essentially extinguished the plaintiff's damages, and re-
lieved Best Sanitary of its liability to the plaintiff.13" The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, holding that Little
Food Town could not be considered to have "released" or absolved
Best Sanitary because the Act expressly provides that a release
naming one defendant does not release all.13 5
The court also noted that the statute protected the settling
party from contribution claims by other nonsettling defendants,
and should therefore also protect the nonsettling defendants from
contribution sought by the settlor.3 6 Had the jury verdict been
greater than $45,000, Little Food Town would have been protected
from contribution and thus shielded from pro rata exposure as a
result of its $45,000 settlement. Consequently, the court held it un-
just to allow Little Food Town contribution when its settlement
later proved disadvantageous. Little Food Town paid a dispropor-
tionate amount of the plaintiff's claim, but that was a circumstance
of its own making. 
7
Both the logic and fairness of Best Sanitary Disposal Co. are
compelling, and the case is consistent with the Uniform Contribu-
tion Act, but it may nevertheless impede the policy of encouraging
Substantial settlements.3 8 Any defendant's counsel who urges set-
tlement runs a risk of embarrassment should the settlement be
greater than a pro rata share of the ultimate verdict. To avoid such
a result, defense counsel may be wise to avoid solo settlements un-
less the sum is plainly less than a proportionate share of the law-
suit's value. Conversely, should the settlement fall too safely below
the expected pro rata share, it could be attacked as lacking "good
faith."
The court's concern for equalizing the benefits and burdens of
the settling defendant may therefore run counter to the goal of
creating a favored position for the settlor.
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's Uniform Contribution Act is a major departure from
common law contribution. It aptly serves the modern goals of con-
tribution: broad distribution of loss and flexible allocation of liabil-
134. Id. at 225.
135. Id. at 225-26; see FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1981).
136. 339 So. 2d at 226.
137. Id.
138. See text accompanying note 112, supra.
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ity. Because the statute now permits relative apportionment of
fault among tortfeasors, contribution is a loss allocation tool that
allows the trier of fact to consider all circumstances relevant to the
fault of wrongdoers. It is thus clearly preferable to the all or noth-
ing remedies of indemnity and subrogation.
When courts engraft time proximity or joint action require-
ments onto the Uniform Contribution Act, they severely restrict
the trier of fact's ability to assign appropriate degrees of liability
among joint tortfeasors. The requirement of "concerted action" or
"common liability" is a technicality that may be irrelevant to the
central issue of fault; it may also produce inconsistent analyses as
courts strain to avoid unjust results. The trier of fact should be
free to weigh such factors as the remoteness in time and attenua-
tion in causality of the tortfeasors' roles when assigning fault.
A more stringent application of the good faith requirement in
settlements is, however, necessary to further the policy favoring
out-of-court resolution of cases. An inexpensive partial settlement
that extricates one defendant at the expense of others will do little
to reduce litigation because the other defendants must proceed to
trial. A court might actually impede the complete settlement of a
case by sanctioning a cheap settlement for one defendant, because
the remaining defendants become more reluctant to settle because
the more fortunate defendant's settlement imposes a greater pro-
portionate liability upon them. Accordingly, the good faith of a set-
tlement should be strictly tested against defined criteria. The crite-
ria should be based on the factors that attorneys consider in any
honest appraisal of a settlement, such as the value, of the plaintiff's
overall claim, the strengths and weaknesses of a particular defen-
dant's position, and even the relative solvency of the defendants.
Although no standards can guarantee good faith, closer guidelines
may encourage defendants concerned with fulfilling the good faith
requirement to agree to higher initial settlements. Such higher ini-
tial settlements would both promote fairness in ultimate loss shar-
ing, and facilitate resolution of the entire litigation by making final
settlement more affordable to the remaining defendants.
Contribution is a doctrine warranting broad application so
that responsibility for wrongdoing may be flexibly allocated. This
vehicle for the sharing of loss should not be compromised by inex-
pensive, partial settlements that can disserve the goal of resolving
cases out of court. Nor should the statutory innovation of contri-
bution be unduly confined by judicially created limitations that ig-
nore the doctrine's equitable purpose.
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